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OUTLOOK FOR WESTERN CIVILIZATION
A
at

lecture

delivered by
C. Hopper
the Naval War College
March 30, 1950

Dr. Bruce

I have cherished so much the privilege of coming to the Naval
War College. I feel like Paul among the Athenians-the Athen
ians were always looking for some new thing. I think the Navy is
that way too. Now I will try to bring out some new ideas here.
What I want to bring out in the first place is time in terms of con
trol of the time table, and not time as distinct from space in terms
of civilization.
It is hard to make revelations about Russia except to repeat
constantly that . there is still darkness in Scythia. I find after
having had six years away from academic life that what measure
of retreat or withdrawal one gets in the academic circle somehow
lengthens the perspective. It may be that the role of professor is
just to find things that are overlooked by the experts.
In my instance what I have been looking for is the some
thing that America once had and has lost. The perspective turns
to western civilization and there are several things which stand out
in my mind. The first is that the Bolsheviks are still completely
convinced that they can last longer than we can in this type of
struggle. The second is that they still control the. time table. The
third is that America's disunity is an aid and comfort to the Bol
sheviks and the despair of our friends. And the fourth is that the
Bolsheviks use time in their calculations as well as space.
Doctor Hopper is Professor of International Relations at Harvard
University and has written several books and articles on Russia.
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Now I know that you have studied a great deal about poli

tics and you will agree with me that timing is the master control

in any program of politics.

one must think of time.

Time must not be overemphasized but

Senator Dixon, one time governor of Mon

tana, used to say that the strange thing is that you go on preparing

and preparing and preparing for something called life, and then

one day yqu awaken to realize that that for which you had been
preparing has already passed you by.

It may be that the dem

ocracies, in facing Bolshevism, go on preparing for a type of strug-

gle that'ma:y never come off: A-bombs, H-bombs, bacteria-all
that.

The struggle might be rather, i� the Russian phrase, a

"kto-kogo" ( ?) .

Who beats who?

Who can outlast the other?

It

may be an attrition not unlike that between the popes and the

emperors for centuries in the Middle Ages.

Obviously all you have to do is read the newspapers or talk

to a Russian to realize that the Bolsheviks are much more confi

dent than we are that they can outlast us.

The reason is that it is

much easier to chop down trees than to replant the forest.

are more time conscious.

We are not time conscious.

didn't give · us much patience here in America.

They

The Lord

We are a speed

people---'-'get it done yesterday-and we want . what we want when

we want it-but quick. Well, in playing chess with the Bolsheviks,

that type of impatience may cost us the queen.

I want to talk about time, always remembering that there

is a tide in the affairs of men, etc.

The totalitarians plan more.

They are compelled to be more time conscious and yet it is surprising
how much help they got from the outside in their effort to gain con

trol of the time table.

In the case of Hitler, for instance, you

can see how the Communists in Germany helped put him in power.

They allied with Hitler against the Weimar Republic.

You can see

how President Roosevelt helped insure Hitler in power by devaluing
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the dollar and thus wi1>ed out 40% of the German debt in 1933,
overnight; how the British gave favorable trade terms; how the
Russians, instead of returning wheat as in the contract for the two
billion . gold marks of machinery supplied by Weimar Germany,
made the payment to Hitler in gold and in armament materials.. The
. outside powers set it up for Hitler and then he went with machine
gun staccato from one point to another after he _had got control of
the time table about 1936, or even 1935.
It was that chronic indecision of the democracies; that in
ability to concentrate on the real enemy. Think of all the gun
ning we did for Mussolini at that time. He could have been had.
There were only a few rocks in the desert-:--a little something on
his chest. He kept telling his people it is better to live one hour
like a lion:than a.hundred years like a sheep. They didn't believe
it. If we had given him a little something we could have kept him
on our side of the fence and the war might have been different.
But in World War II, by the deal with Hitler in August
1939, the Bolsheviks collected loot until June 1941, and were in
abeyance· until· October of 1944 when General Bor put on the up
rising of Warsaw. Our intelligence people say that if they had
kept on coming west the war might have been over the winter of
1944 or 45. But no. The Red Army was diverted into the Danube
to beat the British to Vienna and so. on. From th�n onward, as I
study the records, the Bolsheviks have controlled the time tables.
· At Yalta they determined when they would enter the Pacific
war, for a price. They forced the second ceremony of surrender at
Berlin (after the one at Reims). Thereafter they turned on the
heat and turned it off again, forcing us to put the airlift on Berlin
and deciding when it would cease, the heat on Iran� the heat cm
China, etc., etc. Who controls the time table determines not .only
RESTRICTED
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the order of events in general, but determines the rules, the prin
ciples, . and the fashions of the period. To control the time table
is to get into the driver's seat.
Now I think that there are a number of requirements. I
would like to cite ten selected areas in which America's indecision
allows the Bolsheviks to keep control of the time table. If we are
going to get control, we have to make up our minds about these
particular areas.
As St. Paul wrote to the Corinthians, "If the trumpet gives
an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to battle?" Well, the
answer is of course, no one. During the war, our trumpet had a
very certain sound. Of course there was a unity of purpose which
has since been squandered, and our danger as a nation is perhaps
even greater now-greater in the long terms of history than it was
when the submarines were at the gates, because this danger has to
do with the rise and fall, not only of nations, but of civilization.
And in the long attrition which I see ahead our shining new weapons
may not even be taken out of their wraps. So long as the Bol
sheviks control the time table, they determine the weapons. And
they don't want a shooting war.
So here are ten suggestions in areas where America is con
spicuous for indecision. The first one: We must have a clear
definition of our relations with the Bolsheviks, a definition upon
which we will agree. Now what is it? It is not war and it certainly
is not peace. But that is exactly what Trotsky said when he
stomped home from the first part of the Brest-Litovsk peace con
ference in January, 1918., He wouldn't sign anything with the Ger
mans. He said, "No war, no peace," and ran back to Moscow. The
old soldier, General Hoffman, was not impressed with that Bolshevik
logic, so he ordered the German Army to unlimber the guns. And
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it was then that Lenin decided there would be peace-at least on

paper. Trotsky's formula of January 1918-no war, .no peace-was
not implemented actually until 1945.
under-no war, no peace.

That is what we are living

So how are we going to define this?

I think we have to de

fine it before we can get out of this trap of indecision. ,Suppose we
call it tentatively-"War-in-Peace".

Now that would 'raise a hue

and cry, I know, but "cold war" is too passive a term. "Cold war''
doesn't denote the pressures:

Acceptance of the phrase "War-in

Peace" might change the psychology of the country and put us

on the rails back to the unity of purpose which has been lost.

Recently Dean Acheson came forth with a new phrase

Total Diplomacy.

Well, that's good.

That denotes action at any

rate, but how about something a little bit snappier than that?

The

phrase came to me in the middle of the night as they often do., I

don't know whether you get up and write them down, but I have

learned to do it, because they are gone in the morning. This phrase
came to me-Jujitsu Diplomacy.

That's a little spectacular I ad

strength to break his own bones.

That's exactly what the Bolshe

mit.

The idea of jujitsu is to force the opponent to use his. own

viks do to us..

They use our own citizens - against us-freedom of

speech, freedom of this anp that. In other words, they use Ameri-_
can privileges to destroy America. Dean Acheson's speech in _Cali
fornia I think was a bit jujitsu.

You know, Seven Pillars of Wis

dom on how to make Bolshevik muscles go backward.

That's

what that speech meant. He knew it wouldn't accomplish anything,
except a roar from Moscow, but it was a jujitsu tactic.

So, .if we

are forced to agree that peace is not around the corner, that a

shooting war is not around the corner, I think it would be_ useful

to accept a formula that would define the exact conditions, some-
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thing like a state of War-in-Peace.. We have no precedence and no
rules for such a relationship.
Last December I was out � Pittsburgh. One of the �hings·
I wanted to see was that battlefield in Monogahela where General
Braddock fought in 1755. It is all grown up with steel mills now.
f reread Francis Parkman to get the story straight. Ge:geral Brad· dock was a very gallant soldier but· knew nothing about· Indians.
.There was shooting from· behind the trees. So he spoke to the Vir
ginians, to George Washington. He said, "Stand out there and fight
like soldiers," and so on. Afterwards he said, "This isn't war. This
is murder." He lost his force, and he himself was wounded and died.
Now it seems to me that the democracies are doing what
Braddock was doing, using the rules and principles of honorable
war against the Indians in America. If we are going·to survive the
long attrition, we have to get rid of the General Braddock notions.
One of the first things to do is to decide on a definition of this
struggle---e. g., War-in-Peace.
Then a second decision. I thiiµt this is tearing us apart-·
this loyalty, security-risk business. The Bolsheviks feel more and
more copfident that all they have to do is wait while we blow our
selves apart. · Students of history have seen all this happening be
fore in Greece and in Rome. And we are seeing it happening to us
�this indecision among the citizens on the question of loyalty and
security. It is not a question of loyalty, actually. It is a qu�_stion
of security risk at the policy level or for classified material.
'

.

But in judging and in charging our citizens, I believe the issue
is·the degree of.tolerance they show for the enemies of our society�
internal and external. In their minds, they are completely loyal and
they may even think they are good security· risks. Many of them
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are frustrated intellectuals. They call themselves liberals-actually
they are to liberalism what Hellenistic was to Hellenic-something
pseudo, subsequent, and Easternized. Many find refuge in the aca
demic profession and there they rest on their morals in a sort of
detached intellectual neutrality., The label is given to those people
I think, by the writer of Revelations: "Because thou art neither
hot nor cold, but lukewarm, I will spew thee from my mouth." I

think these people who are neutral in times of peril will be spewed
from the mouth of history. Even the little peasants of Eastern
Europe have a firmer grasp on history. They say that in times of
crisis, either you sing with the angels or you will be forced to howl
with the wolves. There is no happy middle ground. Now perhaps
the Supreme Court will get us out of this trap. It is bad business
and is getting worse.
The third point of the area requmng decision: What is
the political direction of our country? This is something that will
have to go to a national decision. You and I are living with it.
Economically it involves government spending-the danger of bank
ruptcy. It includes academic folks and service people, and aHthose
on fixed incomes and frozen salaries. We see what has been hap.
pening in Europe. There has been a transfer of power since 1914
from the middle class which ruled for over a hundred years. Power
is transferred from the middle class to the industrial working class.

The middle class is being disposessed by a war of taxes.

This means in Europe, and will mean for us, more and more

people shifted over to government employment, a swelling bureau�

cracy-the bureaucracy then absorbing the intelligensia and taking

on the mentality of trade unionism. The creative instinct then dies.
Who then will bear the torch?

There is a line in Virgil that. says,

"Easy is the descent to Hell�" You can misquote Virgil a little bit

by saying that easy is the descent to mediocrity. As Joseph Alsop
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wrote, "Mediocrity begets mediocrity," whether by the crony sys
tem or however else.

When we stop putting quality into the individual, then we

start making a mass man.
way ahead of us.

In mass men the Bolsheviks are a long

I can say, as a historian, and I have spent most

of my time studying history, when everyone is safe, then no one

is free.

As we move in that direction the time will come when our

Statue of Liberty will drop the torch and merely hold a monkey

wrench.

Security-a monkey wrench!

At any rate, if that process is abrupt then we will have too

few moral leaders in the next generation. If it is gradual and spread

over a number of decades, then perhaps we might train moral lead

ers and be able to pass on to them the mantle so that the standards
will not perish.

That is really the great issue of the welfare state.

And yet at night when you are alone you sometimes can hear

Madame Lafarge with her knitting needles at the foot of the guil

lotine.

It can all happen again because the brutalization of western

man is something that we can't measure in our times.

Now the fourth question: What kind of Germany do we

want? America has not made up her mind.

has a very uncertain .sound.

There our trumpet

Some Americans say, "Let German

bodies defend the Ruhr." Germany's historic role was in the North

Sea, the.cradle of our democracy. Western Germany is now the key

stone of the arch of a third power in defense of the Atlantic sea
board.

Much of our democracy came from German tribal sources.

We can't have it both ways as I see it.

Either we take western

Germany into the western family and promote unification of all
Germany, or we must be prepared to see the Germans accept the

Bolshevik unification on the assumption that they, the Germans, in
time can outwit the Russians.

26
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the "Times" this morning that they are not going to allow the

Bonn government to have proper representation in the London
I think it is wrong. I think we should override England

meeting.

-the Labor government at any rate-on such things.
hope for Germany is a Franco-German rapprochment.

Our bigger

A friend of mine, just back from Paris, was telling me about

the new 0. E. E. C. headquarters building which these governments
themselves paid for and built on the grounds of the chateau that

formerly belonged to the Rothschilds. They were confronted with
a problem in bringing in the machinery. There was a beautiful line

of trees there,

Now the Bolshevik method would be to say, "To hell

with the trees, get them out!' I must say that the American method
would also tend in that direction.

that way.

But these people did not think

They erected scaffolding and managed with a great deal

of effort to bring in the machinery over the tops of the trees. They

are very proud because that method signifies the spirit in this new
Europe: preserve what is left of beauty and at the same time

achieve something functional and streamlined.

In that new Europe

there is that essential keystone place for Germany.
do?

So what do we

Do we throw Germany to the wolves or . do we. take her in?

The Germans would like to know and we have to make up our minds
soon.

The fifth area is somewhat similar:

Japan?

What do we do about

Asia is, of course, in this process of rebirth and has been

my main subject for study for twenty years. There will be five-year

plans attempted around Asia. As these new states in the southern

zone move forward in nationalism and independence, I rather expect
to see a shift in diplomatic emphasis from Ea�tern Europe.

We are

going to be squeezed out there, and then we will shift our em
phasis over to Southern Asia.
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Now here is Japan-----0ur special problem! Japan had wQrked
out her old solution with the material at hand-an economic solution�
We stopped it and crushed Japan. So we have to provide something
else or let Japan go the road of China. What are we 1oing to do?
. Are we going to let Japan's industry recover based on a two-way
exchang�raw materials, industrial products, etc. with Southeast
Asia? · That would seem to be our policy.
Le.t us terminate the state of war with Japan. We have more
. ·control out there than we have in Europe. , Especially in General
MacArthur we have a Pro-Consul on a heroic scale. I think we
ought to bring him home and give him a Roman triumph to show
him that his work will be perpetuated and get on with the job so
that we can hold on to Japan.. That should be done soon. Here we
do have master control.
Now the sixth question, which is on a larger scale. Let us
consider whether our crises today involves · Bolshevik expansion
per se or old style Russian imperialism. The Russians in history
have always absorbed their rulers. A number of times a ruler
such as Peter the Great, or Alexan�er the First has made great
effort to modernize the Russians. The process goes on for a while
and then it lapses. ,Russianism re-emerges after· several decades.
Is that going to happen this time? We have had three attempts at
hegemony in Europe-in modern times I mean-French--Louis XIV,
Napoleon; Teuton--Kaiser Wilhelm, and then Hitler� Now comes
Veliki Ross led by the Bolsheviks'. We wilf have to determine
whether this is a -racial thing or purely revolutionary Bolshevism.
What will we be fighting in 20 years? Will it be a type of im
perialism that is ·more Russian than Bolshevik? Or will the Bol
sheviks by that time have taken over an· the satellites · and all of
Asia, and confront us with a revolutionary imperialism. You must
understand that this is a Bolshevik�hate-America campaign. It may
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peter out. We don't know. All l know is that the Russians never
had their day. One faseinating study is to try to discover in ad
vance when they will bring in their brands. Will they revert to
religious, reevangelization, given the freedom to do so?
We can expect a Bolshevik claim for Alaska somewhere along
· the line. They may make it for nuisance value. They'll simply say
thatthe corrupt Tzarist government officials sold Alaska, that it was
never legal, etc., etc., etc. They wouldn't expect to get it back of
course, Jbut just say it for nuisance value. That will come. So in
order to defeat the enemy in a cold or hot war,· we must differ from
them, not in degree but in kind, and understand whether they are
predominantly Russian, Communist, or Bolshevik.
Now the sev�nth question, and I appeal to you as war
riors: Who are our :fighting Allies? Let us pick our Allies and
give them of our substance and our vitality, and let the others
fade.. Let us not permit the false ideas of our peace mongers to in
terfere with this lasting decision in strategy. The :first thing that
strikes us in thinking of Allies, is that our friends of yesteryear
may be our foes of tomorrow. Two good examples are Czechoslo
vakia and China. Conversely, people that we. fought may be our
friends in -strategic bases ·tomorrow-Germany in the west, and
Japan.
Much depends on the ruling group at the time. Italy, for
instance, was with us in the first World War and against us in
the second. Turkey was against us. in the first, but preserved . a
neutrality in our favor in the second. We must seek allies in terms
of these shifting affinities, and then have one criterion. Yes, send
supplies here and there, but consider would we go hunting tigers
with the people in question? Would they climb trees when a tiger
came? Let us have it simple and direct. If we would hunt tigers
RESTRICTED
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with them, then let's build them up; Our friends include the na
tions in the North Sea area in general, Western Germ�ny, and also
Greece and Turkey. They are tiger hunters and so is Japan. The
Japanese will defend their rice patties. I believe Franc�Spain wiU

fight too. When our strategic thoughts will turn to Spain we will
suddenly find that we haven't been so terribly hostile to Franco
after all. His country will fit into the strategic picture. · There
fore, who are our fighting Allies? Let's decide and hand out our
favors accordingly.
My eighth point concerns our principles. What are they
to be in this type of struggle, this War-in-Peace. They· can't be
haphazard. You in the Navy know that well. The first essential
in regard to our principles is to know the enemy's principles. The
outstanding principle of the Bolsheviks is continuous expansion

without shooting wars. Their justification of that is their defin
ition of popular sovereignty. For instance, they have sixteen union
, republics; and they say that each one is sovereign and each is
equal, at an international conference, to any foreign·· state. There
fore it doesn't lose its popular sovereignty on becoming part of the
glorious Soviet Union. Each Union Republic is considered sovereign
because it has the constitutional right to withdraw. Of course, we
· could prove the illusion of all that. However, this point I want to
make: By popular sovereignty the Bolsheviks have justified a sys
tem of expansion which is without precedent in history.

We will not review the whole list of territories they have

taken since 1939.

You will see . how easy and wonderful it is for

them, and h.,ow we have allowed it all to happen because we didn't
contest them on this method of popular sovereignty.

Start at

this point: the frontiers. That is where popular sovereignty can be
utilized.

Note that in the various frontiers there is a tribal kin

ship with the peoples outside the frontiers. This is utilized by the

30
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Bolsheviks when it · comes to expansion. The first one that is of
special interest to you in the Navy is the Norwegian frontier. Ex
amine the Arctic coast, the Kola Peninsula to the Atlantic. In that
area live the people of Anderson's fairy tales, the Lapps. I forget
the exact number overall, but they exist in the Russian part, in
.Sweden, and in Norway. In that area is the largest and most val
uable notrhernmost port of the world, Narvik. If they controlled
the Arctic coast, there wouldn't be that convoy trouble around
North Cape again as in the last war. · A Lapps' Peoples Republic
would unite the natives of that northern zone. They would probably
even speak of a Lapp proletariat. They don't have to be consistent,
you see, in putting this thing over.
Another hot frontier with ·a . similar tribal kinship present
is down in Macedonia. I am not quite sure in my mind just what
is a Macedonian. We know that some of them live in Greece, some
in Yugoslavia and some in Bulgaria. I don't know whether there are
any in Albania or not, but the Macedonian movement is always
there. They do have a literary langu�ge of their own. So when
the movement comes, when it is propitious for the Russians to put
the heat on Macedonia, then they will operate out of Bulgaria.
Another interesting area is in Turkey, U. S. S. R. because
the Armenian questions people outside the frontier. Armenia, of
course, in the 13th and 14th centuries was a very powerful state in
the Near East, thus the memory of a glorious tradition. When
the Russians get ready to put the heat on Turkey for control of
the Straits, then a Greater Armenian Peoples Republic · is to be
expected. It is a set-up. The same thing applies to Azerbaijan. The
Azerbaijan people on the Soviet side and the Azerbaijan people on
the Persian side are .of the same Turkish stock, neither Persian or
Russian. The strength of this racial desire or racial coherence is
again an instrument that the Bolsheviks could and would use when
RESTRICTED
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they get ready to push for the Suez and India. Now note the
relations of China with the old tributary states. Siam as well as

1

Burma fall into a special category. Anything can happen there.
Then in the course of twenty years with this Russian glacier com

ing into the Bay of Bengal on the East and down to the Persian
Gulf on the West, India would be in the pincers.

what we'll see before we ever get to a shooting war.

That may be

So I say, that confronted with enemy principles in. opera�

tion, we must have our principles of our aim;

Let us see how far

the immutable principles of war, so-called, could be applied to a prO'.

longed attrition without shooting.
First-Objective.

The objective in this type of war I have

described is to overcome the enemy's will.to expand through the use
of popular sovereignty without shooting.

That is what he wants

to expand without shooting. Now we must.overcome his will. That

is the objective.

The second principle-,..,.Offensive. That means,,to

contr.ol the time table. A direct idea of offensive is to control the
time· table and take the initiative.

Let us dwell on those two and

leaving aside all the others-economy of·force,·movement, surprise,
etc.,-except for logistics.

My ninth requirement in this War-in-Peace is Logistics-

what to do about matepal production, imports, exports, etc. Logis
tics is a requirement and a principle.

Effective ·preparations. and

decisions must be made to determine the necessary amounts of

supplies and man power to be utilized.

The tenth point, and this is my clinchng thought in this

development, is what interim strategy should we have at • this

time in this War-in-Peace? I arrive at that by giving our in

.terim strategy if we applied just the two first and most important
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principles of war.. I would say that the principle of objectives is the

restoration of the balance of power in Europe. That is our only way

to get back to free wheeling. I don't want to go through the history

of security, from unity to balance of power, to this collective idea,

the universal type under the League of Nations and the U. N., and

to the regional type that we are now working out in the North At

lantic Treaty.

I will say, as a student of history, that I believe that the

only feasible method of the state system, as presently constituted,
is balance of power. That is exactly what we are doing. I think we

have no complaint to find with the State Department.

By the poli

tical means (the North Atlantic Alliance, plus the Franco-German

rapprochment,) the economic means (the ECA) and the military
means, this process is now going on.

Military assistance to gov

ernments of Europe would strengthen their hands against internal
sabotage and destroy the illusion that an aggressor could have a

quick campaign without much bloodshed, as the Germans believed

in 1914 and again in 1939. Above all, while we are arming Europe,

the most important objective is to deny the Atlantic seaboard to

the Russian snorkels. German submarines in two wars came pretty

close to pulling it off. Maybe next time the Russian snorkels, with
German help, might be able to do it.

At any rate, when that

vacuum created by World War II is filled, and Western Europe in

tegrated-at least in a military sense-then, with a Third Power
in existence, the Balance of Power is restored.

Now the second principle-the principle of offensive.

I

will try to give you something new which you can toss back at me.

And I won't be able to defend it.

I think that the offensive is

just as necessary to victory in this type of War-in-Peace as it is in
a shooting war.

Some of you will recall that the French, at the

time of the Battle of the Marne, retreated, dragging their guns
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through the dust. For days they retreated, retreated, retreated.
Finally came the order, "Stand on the hills, south of the Marne.

Point your guns north and get ready to advance." Well, you might

say a thrill went through that army. A psychological change came
over the French after their retreat; retreat and then advance! That
is what I want to see happen to our country.
the

First we must take

offensive in this interim strategy (and it is only interim).
The Russians stalk out of the U. N.

need the U. N.

Let us not forget it.

Let them stay out. They
We must not repeat the

blunder we made during the war, assuming that they wanted a
separate peace.

That was a crowning blunder stemming, I believe,

from the White House.

Let them get the idea that the U. N. is

pointed towards an alliance outside the Iron Curtain.

But let us

not make the mistake of saying that it is useless to _operate with
out the Bolsheviks.

As for the Chinese delegates who are the tar

gets of their fire, if we throw Dr. Tsiang to the wolves we will de
serve very small credit in history.

Keep him on ice and give him

some function until the Assembly meets in September, and then,
who knows, we might be able to run him as a candidate and get a
new Secretary General.

It might be a good idea.

That would be

putting cockleburrs under the saddle of the Bolsheviks.
what I call

fair.

That's

offensive.

Now the offensive we can take in regards to the atomic af

International inspection would mean the end of Bolshevism.

What about those fifteen million or more slave laborers?
simply cannot allow foreigners to run around in Russia.

had their consent to inspection, it would be postponed.

do a lot amongst ourselves.

allies on atomic policies.

They

So if we

But we can

We can at least unify the western
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Next come the offensive in regard to Germany.

Let us

terminate the state of war with all German people-not only West

ern Germany, but Eastern Germany.
making a peace treaty.

It is not yet the time for

The Bolsheviks may go in and perhaps an
We have them in a box now.

We can do

Germany wi�hout making a fifth partition of Poland.

That's our

nex Eastern Germany.

a little jujitsu if we are clever enough.
jujitsu. Let's get on with it.

The Kremlin cannot unify

And immediately what shall we do?

They talk about launching the youths of Eastern Germany into
Berlin in May.

Let's send General Clay back to Berlin. He's the

idol of the German people.

What are we doing with him now?

Why, he-is lecturing at Harvard this week.

There's a bigger job

than that for him.

Send him back there with any kind of cooked

the Germans trust.

It would be a signal to them that we do not

up mission just so he is there in Berlin, because he is a figure that
intend to get out of Berlin. Take the offensive.

Go in and make an offensive in regard to this national com

munism from outside the Iron Curtain-Yugoslavia, China, and
the others.

The State Department has a policy of erosion, I

don't know exactly what it means but it sounds good.

I would say

that the offensive in the Far East should include the termina

tion of the state of war in Japan and building up the economic

answer to Japan through southeast Asia and eventually point to

trade with China so as to get Japan off the taxpayers' neck here

in America. These offensives must be multiplied, using all types

-Point Four economic strategy, etc. My idea is that somewhere
along the line, after we get into the habit, we can take the of
fensive.

time.

I don't mean at the drop of a hat, but to work it out in

As long as we do not take the offensive we will never get

· control of the time table.

If we do take it somewhere along the

line while we are keeping our atoms d:ry, we will awaken one day
to find we have the stop watch and that we are calling the time.
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A long buildup is necessary because our people assume that
an offensive is something wicked and practiced only by aggressors
bent on a shooting war. That isn't true at all. An offensive is the
only way that we can save ourselves from perishing through at
trition and from crumbling within. As an example of our blunder
ing zeal, I could quote the Nuremberg trials. We have got to"get
as far. away from Nuremberg psychology as we possibly can. We
have to adopt a technique we have never met before in history. In
other words, we must call on God to help us. Everything was a liv
ing contradiction in these trials, with the Russians being judges in
their own cause and preventing the Katyn massacre from coming
before the court. I won't cite it, but · I do hope that members of
the college will take advantage of the opportunity to read about the·
Katyn massacre in the report I am leaving here.
Now there is just one more thought. As part of our offensive
technique--our preservation of strength-let us keep our President
at home. By that I mean that every time an American President
has gone abroad, it has brought disaster on Western civilization. It
looks as though the President goes into the camp of the Philistines
and, like Samson, he gets his hair cut when he is asleep. You can
see it in the case of President Wilson for instance. There he was
with his Fourteen Points, the loftiest peace program ever devised
by man. He was sitting pretty. Then ·came the armistice! All he
had to do was to sit still and say, "Here we are., Make your terms
and bring them over to me. I have the Army. I have the Navy. I
have the money. So decide between yourselves and then let me 0. K.
it." Something happened to him in November. I do not know
whether Mrs. Wilson had a yen for Paris or not_. I do know that
the· French Ambassador handed a memo to President Wilson pro
posing· that the victorious Allies not negotiate with the vanquished
powers, but decide among themselves the · terms and then call in
the Germans merely to sign. That was contrary. to Wilson's prin-
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ciples of life. But he simply tossed the thing in his trunk. After
all he was going to Paris, in spite of the fact that Colonel House
said, "Don't Mr. President, don't come to Europe. Stay there in
America."· He went to Paris.
President Wilson landed in Brest and one description which
I read in the French papers said that there hadn't been such a scene
since Julius Caesar set out to conquer Britain in 54 B. C. From
But did he follow Colonel House's inthere he came to Paris.
·,
train, go to the American part
American
junction. to get on the
of the front, speak to . the troops, then fall back to the balcony at
the Embassy in Paris to receive the plaudits of the multitudes and
then get back on the SS George Washington and go home? No!
On the fourteenth of December, the crowd just choked the square
from wall to wall. Here came the .Messiah from the west! And
with Mrs. Wilson in that shining new automobile-well, it was
more than the old Presbyterian could stand. He was just carried
away and he stayed. He lingered there amongst the Philistines
and began to get his hair cut. One by one his points went down
the drain. And in the final analysis, he got his covenant hitched
onto the treaty and he had to agree to all those thing&-the giv
ing away of Shantung, etc., which caused the Senate to toss the
whole thing out of the window.
Looking back, we see that if President Wilson had only
stayed at home and allowed the mountain to come to Mohammed,
history would have been different. Who learned a lesson from
that? Not President Roosevelt, because he used to go over and
have.a·chat with Stalin without taking his long·spoon. Rememl>er?
And so there has been one conference after another. We won't
go into them. We will just say that there was disaster stemming
from Yalta which will perhaps be with the human race for a cen
tury. And then President Truman came to Potsdam. At least he
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put his chop on things. The power of the President is so vast that
we should not allow him to go on the front side of the Statue of

Liberty.

You read in the press, as we are reading now, about other

Presidential trips.

All these people, including even Senator Tyd

ings who knows better, and Churchill, who knows better with his
tongue in cheek, know it is all nonsense.

We have had enough

presidential haircuts to last us for a century.

So I say keep the

President at home as part of this new type of thinking.
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